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Artificial lnteYigenee research has come under fire for failing to fulfill its promises. A
gro_ing number of AI rest archers are reexamining the bases of A I research and are }
challenging the assumption that hdelligent behavior can be fully exl)lnined as manipu- I
lat|on of symbols by algorithms. Three recent books -- Mind orer Machine {It. Dreyfus "
and S. Dreyfus), Unrler,tondiTt 9 Com;,uter_ and Cogn;.tion (T. W'nograd and F. Fh,res), and
llraina, Behavior, and Robot* (J. Albus) -- explore alternatives and open the door to new
arehilectures that may be able to h,arn skills.
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between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration {NASA)
and the Universities Sp_ce Research Association {USItA).
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Can machines think? This question has fascinated inventors, philosophers, _,..
and logicians for centuries. In 1938, the British mathematician Alan Turing
showed that a simple computational model, now called the Turing machine, was
capable of universal computation: it could simulate the computation of any
other Turing machine. This simulation is the basis of stored-program comput- !!
J
ers. It might seem then that stored-program computers would e'entually be i
capable of simulating arbitrary human actions. For with information .bout tile _
sta'.e of every neuron and the mechanics of neuron firing, it would seem possible
to compute the next state of someone's every neuron and thus foretell that
person's next action. Granted, in practice it may be impo,_sible to acquire suffi-
cient information for a precise prediction, Lut in principle it seems possible to
program machines to act like people.
In 1950, Turing proposed a method of determining how close a machine
might be to acting human. His method, now called tile Turing test (I),
• ©
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envisages a human interrogator communicating with two entities by tele.type:
one a human, the other a computer. How long would it take the inttrrogator to
determine which is which? How reliable might tile determination be? Turing
asserted that in fifty years' time it would be possible to make computers play the
imitation game so well that 70% of interrogators would not make the right iden-
tification after five minutes of questioning. This llne of reasoning underlies con-
i
temporary approaches to evaluating the skill of expert ._ystems. The longer it i
takes a human expert to distinguish the actions of a program from the actions of
a fellow expert, the more skillful the program is judged. This line of reasoning i
also leads some artificial intelligence (AI) programmers to be tolerant of pro-
grams that make mistakes, as long as the error rate is no worse than that of
human experts.
Turing did well to replace the question, Can machines think? with the ques-
tion. Itowwellcana digital computer program imita_e people? The terminology i
z
of the original question is too open to endless philosophical inquiry. What is a -.
machine? What is thought? Turing offered a related, but not equivalent, qucs-
tion that could be resolved scientifically by experiment. An experiment to
answer the original question is about as meaningful as an experiment to deter-
mine whether I have a soul.
How good is the substitute question? \\:ill computer programs ever mimic
human actions faithfully? It is important to realize that, while logic and science
may help shed light on this question, it cannot be settled purely by argument or
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by experiment.
AI research has had many year_' experience tussling with tills seemingly
more answerable question. In 19137, Marvin Minsky of MIT speculated that a
computer with a properly organized set of one million facts about everyday life
should be able to exhibit very great intelligence. Today's computers can easily
store st"eral tim_.s this amount of information and yet no one has suctccded in
constructing an intelligent program. Around 1970, chess master David Levy {
challenged predictions that chess programs would soon play at master levels. He
offered a prize to anyone who could write a computer program within ten years ,,
that would beat him; to this day, no one has constructed a program that can
win more than one or two games out of ten against Levy. Around 1980, the
Japanese began asserting that they would be able to construct many computer
l,rograms possessing expert levels of skill in selected domains. Will they succeed?
intelligelice has been a moving target for simulators..Most I,eople distin- ..
guish between a complex mechanism and the thought process that created it.
(Patent law makes this distinction as well.) Automatic pilots are expert fliers,
but they are not pilots. Computer programs that search four moves ahead may
be formidable chess players, butthey are not masters. In 1966, Joseph Weizen-
baum ol MIT wrote a program called Eliza, a version of which simulated conver-
sations of a psychologist ('2). Eliza performed simple transformations on prede-
fined kcywords in the input text; in response to "I'm feeling X," it might type,
"Why are you feeling X?" With Eliza, Weizcnbaum demonstrated that it is pos-
i
d
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sible to make convincing demonstrations of intelligence without giving tile pro-
gram any real understanding at all. As soon as someone finds a way of mechan-
. izing a class of human actions, people tend to stop regarding those actions as
intelligent; indeed, they often want the machines to take over the tedious rou-
tine!
It is disquieting to a growing number of AI researchers that the fundamen-
tal question of their field is so slippery. The elusiveness of answers has brought
out tile skeptics. David Parnas and John Shore have criticized the trial-and-
error approach to programming expert systems; Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus have
asserted that after 25 years AI has failed to live up to its promises, and there is
no evidence that it ever will; Douglas Hofstadter says that the way many AI
questions are posed is shallow. A growing number of AI researchers ask, Why is
it so difficult to click intelligent behavior from machines? Is it poor engineering?
Overly ambitious goals? Or is there something fundamental that puts the goals
beyond our reach? The continuing debar _-may produce a new perspective on the
role of machines in human society.
Three recent books shed intriguing new light on these old questions. The
first, ,_gnd over Machine, by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, analyzes the ability of
machines to achieve human skills (3). The second, Understandir,9 Computers and
Cognition, by Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores, analyzes the pos3ible rela-
tions between humans and machine._ in search of new foundations for computer
design (._). The third, Brains, Behavior, and Robots, by James Albus, analyzes
• " ._'I .6. ". ' .., t', _. • '- _ ".'-: :"
b .._.
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\ the characteristics of intelligent behavior and computing architectures required
to simulate them (5). As you will see, the books shed light on each other as well.
; The Dreyfuses set out to show that human beings have intelligence that
machines cannot match. To support their argument, they analyze human skills,
an important aspect of intelligence, distinguishing five levels: novice, advanced
beginner, competent performer, proficient performer, and expert. The novice
knows basic facts about a subject and context-independent rules for using those
facts. The advanced beginner is able to recognize a few common situations and
perform associated actions, and is able to take context into account. The com-
petent performer experiences a high level of personal involvement in the subject;
his behavior is strongly goal-oriented. He is able to act without conscious
thought about the rules and to reason analytically about situations. The profi-
cient performer is able to recall whole situations and apply them to the present
without having to decompose them into componen's. The expert is fully
involved in the situation, ha little awareness of the skill, and makes little cons-
cious use of analytic reasoning; when exercising tile skill, he operates in a larger
world where he visualizes and manipulates whole objects and situations.
A good example tliat occurs to me to illustrate these points is the skill of
writing. The novice depends on books detailing the rules of grammar, punctua-
tion, and spelling; he finds writing correct sentences and paragraphs a tedious
process requiring frequent reference to the rule books. The advanced beginner
knows most of the major rules and can write sentences and paragraphs without
?
y ................. . . . . • _,
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having to look much up. The competent writer thinks more about the act of
communicathlg than about the details of writing; he has learned rules of style
and applies them automatically, and he is good at constructing and using out-
lines. The proficient writer feels completely at ease with writing; he seldom
makes mistakes in grammar or style; he is able to analyze and edit his own writ-
. •
ing; he is able to imitate the writing styles of others; he makes good use of fig-
ures of speech and other rhetorica), devices; he is able to plan and execute large
works. The expert writer lives in a world of ideas that be feels an urge to com-
municate. He is constantly formulating ways to say new things and new ways to
say old things; he is able to communicate moods; he can imitate many styles of
writ ing but he has his own style so distinctive that he can detect instantly when
an editor has changed a single word of his work. the expert can formulate large
works in his head, moving easily between general and detailed views.
In this hiererchy, manipulation of rules and symbols is characteristic of the
lowest skill levels; the recall of highly abstract patterns is characteristic of the
highest skill levels. The rules for the lowest levels can be writlen down unambi-
guously and used immediately by a novice; the skills of the highest levels are
learned only through many repetitions. The Dreyfuses refer to the ability to per-
form at high levels as know-how, whic.h they distinguish from the ability to
manipulate symbols and rules. They argue that the stored-program computer,
which is good at manipulations of rules and symbols but incapable of fast com-
putations of whole patterns, is unlikely to pass much beyond the stage of bare
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competence. According to their account, entirely different forms of computation
are involved in know-how, and tile only existing device with some of the required
properties of know-how is the holograml where the entire image is encoded into
every local region and where similarities can be determined by passing light .:
through two holograms. Virtuall)', nothing is known about the architecture or
function of pattern computers, least of all whether they would have the human
power to form images that are :." _tractions of other images.
The Dreyfuses conclude that stored-program computers cannot perform at
high levels of skill because their internal structure is incapable of processing _:
information in the same way human experts do. They warn that there is a" lurk-
;7
ing danger in research i,rograrns founded on the belief that today's computers
can l,e smart: rather than waste the large investment, people will try to use 7.,
.i
expert systems anyway. *lerely competent programs will bc deployed where
not]ring le._s than full expert skill is required. They also say that expert systems
used to teach or train may limit the progress of students to rule and sy:nbol "
manipulation, whereas true expertise moves well beyond that, into know-how.
Like the Dreyfuses, Winograd and Flores are troubled by the inability of
modern AI research to fulfill its promises. By analyzing the framewort: in which
research is pursued, the nature cf the questions being asked, and the approaches
to '_hese questions, they hope to open a new perspective. ' i
According to their view, the basic questions of bt,".rest in computing are "
questions of design: What pu-noses do ,:omputers serve in the context of human
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practice? Design involves not just how computers operate hut how they affect
people. For example, a word processor looks di.fferent to different observers: to
its manufacturer, it looks like a box of electronics; to its programmers, it looks
like a package of software; to writers, it looks like a tool for effective communica-
tion. To all three, it is most visible when it breaks down.
Winograd and Flores find that our approach to design is strongly influenced
by our tradition: the entire context of experience and ways of viewing the world,
the common set of unspoken assumptions. Tradition is concealed by its gratui-
tousness. The Western scientific tradition -- scientific method -- holds that
knowledge is objective; it values explicit theories that can Le systematically used
for predictions about parts of objective reality. Winograd and Flores call this
the rationalistic tradition. The computer tradition, which derives from the
rationalistic tradition, values information, representation, and decision-making;
it also emphasize. _ analogies with the brain and int_.lligence, as well as other
ant hropomorphlsms.
The rationalistic prol)iem-solving l,rocess, held in high esteem by Western
scientist_, consists of three parts: give a precise statement of the situation in
terms of objects and relationships among them; enumerate alternatives for solu-
tion; and evaluate each alternative until one of sufficiently low cost is found.
Stored-program computers are ideally suited to this process: c.bjects, relation-
ships, and rules can be represented unambiguously as programming-language
constructs; methods such as deduction and search can be used to enumerate
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alternatives; calculations and comparisons can be used to select a low-cost alter-
native. Much of current research in AI has a fundvmental orientation that
equates intelligence _ith rationalistic prob!em solving using heuristic procedures.
t
If these are the only elements of human cognition, Winograd and Flores ask,
(
then why are mindlike properties attributed to computers but not to other dev-
ices that provide or process information?
Considerable evidence is presented by Winograd and Flores to show that
cognition is not based only on systematic manipulation of representations. The i'i
s
Dreyfuses' argument abc,ut skill levels and know-how illustrates the point.
Rationalistic problem solving i3 at best a partial description of how people solve
problems: people get thrown into situations and react. The world is constantly
being interpreted by the organisms in it. The structure of a given organism :'
plays a central roie in determining the interpretations of which that organism is
capable, and similar organisms evolve interpretations that have enough in com- ;_
mon to alloy: com-mmication anmng them. tiere is where the crucial difference
between a stored-program computer and a person shows up: a compuLer
processes symbols without regard to their meaning; a person processes every-
thing within a framework of interpretations. Stored-program computers have
the wrong structure to compute like people.
Winograd and Flores call for anew orientation: let's ask not how to make
computers behave more like people but how to design computers to help pcc21e
do things more effectively. Some of the things computers are especially good at
€
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are executing algorithm:, retrieving, information, processing aml filtering signals.
assisting with communicatior _nd menitoring processes. Machires used in these
ways can have a significant positive effect on society. D,-sign processes, that
emphasize creative ways to use mach;.nes to help people are likely to succeed.
Winograd and Flores' book leaves an impression that searclfing for
machines that think or understand is futile. The Dreyfuses are not so sure:
although they feel that stored-program computers cannot achieve mindlike pro-
perties, they leave open the possibility that other architectures might.
._
Aibus is nmch more confident that mindlike behavior can be elicited from
machines. He is mostly interested in machines whose architecture resembles the
human nervous system. (This is renfiniscent of the argument of \Vinograd and
d
Flores: structure determines function.) In 1950, Turing discussed two approaches
to building machines that compete with people in intellectual fit,his. The first is
to pursue very abstract activities, such as logical deducti.,n or chess. The second
is to provide the machine with sophisticated sensory or&ans and a n,('c!,anism for .,
storing complex codes de_Joting moments of experience: by repeated exposure to
sensory patterns, the3e machines could come to recognize familiar patterns and
perform associated actions• Albus says that most AI research has followed the i
former path, perhaps because many of the ear]}" workers were mathematician._
(
skilled ilx abstract reasoning. Virtually the e_,tire effort, in AI has been dedicated
to modeling the abstract reasoning power of the thinking mind.
o
h
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Alb_s suggests away of foll¢_wing Turing's second approach. Ra:!. _r than
start at the top of the hierarchy of biological flmctions, _e would _tart at the
bottom, reproducing the control functions and beha ,,_r_i patterns of insects,
birds, mammals, and primates. He would use thc3e as building blocks for tF.,
higher-level functions of the humar, being, ultimately coming to undcrstar_d the
mechanisms that give rise to intelligence, and abstract though_ in the human
brain. As a step in t' is direction, he a,:alyzrs thr. components of',he hum_:r_ nr.r-
vous system and describes a Cerebellar Mo(lel Arithmetic Computer, on wh".ch he i:_
holds a patent, as an archhecture capable of reproducing man'.' of tke nervous
system's behaviors. Mucl'. of his •book is de,'r, ted to showing how this computer
could be taught and. after learning, how it coulo carry out functions o1 various
nervous systems and react to complicated stimuli. He t,_ __nshows how it could
be taught to act as a stored-program computer.
I find the arguments of th.,se writers refreshing and exc;.ting. Rather tL__n
close the door on AI research. *by:," rev,_al new doors. Some of their explorations
will lead to new computers polentia!ly capable of processing !nformation more
like lmxmni experts. Others will h'ad to better fornmlated design questions. But
I doubt that the debate about whether computers can simulate thinking will ever
end. Perhaps stored-program computers can't ever think, but maybe another
kind of compu* er ....
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